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| : | | | FAR EAST | | |
| | 1. 2. | Communists trying to expa Burma described as "weal | and air operations in Kore sest link" in Southeast Asi | ea (page 3). ia (page 4). | |
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| | 3. | US delegate urges speedy | UN Security Council actio | n on Kasılınır (page 4 | :/) • |
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| | | E A SO | TERN EUROPE | | |
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| | 7. | Yugoslavia ready to sign b | ilateral arms agreement | (page 7). | |
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FAR EAST

| 1. | Communists trying to expand air operations in Korea: | |
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| | The Far East Command believes that intensive construction efforts at two new Communist airfield locations in northwestern Korea may be in preparation for large-scale air operations from Korean fields. | 25X1 25) |
| | During the past week, photo interpretation has indicated the construction of revetments and the resurfacing, possibly with concrete, of runways at two new airfields, at Taechon and Namsi, north of Sinanju. Each field, capable of supporting jets when completed, will be about 6,500 feet long with revetments for 45 aircraft. The field under construction at Taechon is protected by an unusual concentration of both heavy and light antiaircraft weapons. | |
| | In the light of the recent expansion of Communist jet interception activities to the Sinanju area, Far East Command states that a "continuation of the high level of enemy air activity in this region would undoubtedly render UN air efforts north of Pyongyang extremely hazardous Under these circumstances "it would be possible for the Communists to base aircraft on these facilities with relative safety" | • 11 |
| | and the ability to destroy enemy air facilities before they became operational have been predominant factors preventing extensive enemy air operations from Korean bases. This intensive airfield construction, well within the defensive range of Communist jet interceptors from Antung, suggests a Communist strategy of "leapfrogging" units to airfields farther south in order to challenge UN air supremacy closer to the battle line. | |
| | On 22 October, nine UN medium bombers attacked the airfield at Taechon and, according to press accounts, "knocked it out." | |
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| Burmese Communists w by the end of 1952, and "autonomous" state in the | Southeast Asi | | 25 |
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| by the end of 1952, and | ill have firmly es | | 11 05 |
| | | robably create a Ch | the 25 s in Upper Burma ninese-controlled |
| recommending that the I Nehru that he take the o Prime Minister to discu solve Burma's difficulti | British Governmer ccasion of his fort ss the possibility | hcoming meeting wi | Prime Minister th the Burmese |
| | Comment: | | |
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| | SOUTH ASIA | | |
| 3. US delegate urges speed | y UN Security Cou | ncil action on Kash | mir: |
| Paris on 29 October. A of agreement and disagr | of the Pakista need for imme case when the ustin suggests pre | Austin states that the ni Prime Minister of the ediate consideration Security Council responds a resolution and Pakistan or | emphasized the of the Kashmir econvenes in outlining areas |
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| instructing UN Representative Graham to continue his efforts to effect demilitarization, and possibly extending his authority to fields outside the narrow limits of that subject. Austin also suggests a declaration that the Security Council will not recognize actions of the recently "elected" Kashmi Constituent Assembly. Comment: Disavowal by the Security Council of Indian-sponsored Constituent Assembly actions should produce an adverse reaction from the Indians. The "election" of the Assembly has been widely publicized as an expression of the will of the Kashmiris, and New Delhi undoubtedly foresees imminent ratification by the Assembly of Kashmir's accession to India. | ative Graham to continue his efforts to effect de- |
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| NEAR EAST | |



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| | EASTERN EUROPE | |
| 7. | Yugoslavia ready to sign bilateral arms agreement: | • |
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| | Assistant Foreign Minister Mates has assured Ambassador Allen that the Yugoslav Government | |
| | now has a clear conception of the cooperative character of US military assistance and that he | |
| | is certain@hat the bilateral arms aid agreement can be carried out in this spirit. | |
| | The Yugoslav Government therefore proposes | |
| | that the agreement be signed as soon as possible and that the chief of the US military group, General Harmony, and an initial staff of six or seven officers, | |
| | come to Yugoslavia at their earliest convenience to work out details. Mates explained that the Yugoslav Government now appreciates that the US Govern- | |
| | ment needs to furnish satisfactory reports to Congress on use of the military | |
| | equipment. He added that recent discussions had also brought out the Yugo- | |
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